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securities. 29  Such is reported to have been a consideration that was
persuasive to the General Assembly of 1923 in giving full exemption
to foreign stock.30 In 1930 tie Tax Commission advised that this
complete exemption created an unfair relationship in taxing policy as
between domestic and foreign corporations, and advised the special
income tax as a fair policy.3 1 Equable taxation and fiscal expediency
were deemed to demand that this stock not be taxed at ad valorem
rates. But the same is true regarding other forms of intangibles.
The legal remedy lies in constitutional amendment which will permit
comprehensive classification.
E. M. PERKINS.
Workmen's Compensation-Accident Arising Out of and
In Course of Employment In North Carolina.*
Few sections of the.North Carolina Workmen's Compensation
Act' have called for such frequent application and construction as
§2 (f), 2 which provides that compensable "injury" shall mean only
"injury by acident arising out of and in the course of the employment
." With a few exceptions, the North Carolina cases have reflected
a disposition toward a liberal construction of this section, but not
toward the radically liberal attitude adopted by some jurisdictions.
In the cases which have arisen under §2 (f), there are many in which
the accident clearly either did or did not arise out of and in the course
of the employment; these will be appended in footnotes at the appro-
priate places, and the body of the note -will be devoted to a considera-
tion of what are thought to be the more interesting and "border-line"
cases. 3
Possibly only acute analysts of their investments consider the corporation's
taxes in deciding where to invest their money. The investor might not look
beyond the tax liability of the stock in his own hands.
I REPORT OF THE N. C. TAX COMMISSION (1930) p. 28.
'REPORT OF THE N. C. TAX COMMISSION (1930) pp. 28, 29; see REPORT oF
THE N. C. TAX CoMMISSION (1928) 321, at 356. "It is not the exemption of
foreign stock per se that is objectionable, but the discrimination involved in
exempting stock and taxing bonds and other intangibles."
* This note is an attempt to collate the North Carolina cases decided under
§2 (f) of the North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act since the writing
of an article entitled Nine Months of Workmen's Compensation in North Car-
olina, by Mr. A. K. Smith, which appeared in 8 N. C. L. REv. 418 (1930).
' N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §8081 (h) et seq.
2 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §8081 (i) (f).
' The decisions of both the North Carolina Industrial Commission (either
of a single Commissioner or the full Commission) and of the North Carolina
Supreme Court are considered. All references to the "Supreme Court" are to
the Supreme Court of North Carolina.
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The cases are susceptible of division into several categories on the
basis of their facts.
Going To and From Work.
The general rule is that an employee is not entitled to compensa-
tion for injuries received while going to or from work.4 In one
case, a National Guardsman5 had been ordered to report to camp.
While on the way to the camp in his own car he was fatally injured
in a collision. He was entitled to be paid for his services from the
time that he left home. The Supreme Court held that the accident
did not arise out of and in the course of the decedent's employment.0
'Cody v. Graham County Board of Education, 1 N. C. I. C. 407 (1930)
(teacher slipped on rock in going home from school); Milsaps v. Graham
County Board of Education, 1 N. C. I. C. 408 (1930) (teacher injured while
returning from home to school district in which he taught) ; Lyon v. Allen
Milling Co., 1 N. C. I. C. 477 (1930) (salesman slipped while filling radiator
preparatory to going to work) ; Beck v. Huntley-Stockton-Hill Co., 2 N. C.
I. C. 53 (1930) (clerk injured on way home after doing extra work at store) ;
Pressley v. Woody Brothers' Bakery, 2 N. C. I. C. 87 (1930) (employee in-
jured while cranking truck preparatory to going to work) ; McCarter v. Osceola
Mill, 2 N. C. I. C. 116 (1930) (employee slipped on icy path while on way to
work); Moore v. Pine Hall Brick & Pipe Co., 2 N. C. I. C. 162 (1931) (em-
ployee injured while on way home after having truck repaired for employer) ;
Osborne v. Rockingham School Board, 2 N. C. I. C. 298 (1931) (teacher fell
down steps of teacherage while starting to school) ; Waters v. Ritter Lumber
Co., 3 1N. C. I. C. 13 (1931) (employee's feet froze as result of walk home
after work through snow); Ellrod v. Southern Desk Co., 3 N. C. I. C. 65
(1931) (employee injured when he stepped from ar in front of rooming
house); Bray v. W. H. Weatherly & Co., 3 N. C. I. C. 75 (1931) (employee
injured while on way to employer's home to get truck in morning).
Note (1917) 12 N. C. C. A. 368 (accidents while on way to or from place
of employment) ; (1931) 8 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rlv. 699.
With Waters v. Ritter Lumber Co., supra, cf. Brady v. Oregon Lumber
Co., 117 Ore. 188, 243 Pac. 96 (1926), rehearing denied, 245 Pac. 732 (1926)
(plaintiff, after having been paid off, left logging camp for town; his feet
were frozen on the way; compensation denied).
In Thomas v. Carolina Theatre, 1 N. C. I. C. 381 (1930) plaintiff was assist-
ant manager of defendant theatre. After closing the theatre at night, and while
on his way home, some highwaymen accosted him and forced him, at the point
of a gun, to return to the theatre and open a safe, which the men robbed. After
taking the money, one of them hit plaintiff and injured him. Held, the injury
was compensable. '
In Ruffin v. Golden Belt Mfg. Co., 3 N. C. I. C. 17 (1931) decedent was ac-
customed to go to work about an hour earlier every morning in order to exercise
the horses of the president of defendant company. The president, not the com-
pany, paid decedent for this. Decedent was killed while riding one of the
horses after the time his duties were to begin for defendant company. Hcld,
no recovery.
'That a National Guardsman is an employee of the state, see Baker v. State,
200 N. C. 232, 156 S. E. 917 (1931) ; commented on in (1931) 37 W. VA. L. Q.
452.
, Hunt v. State, Adjutant General's Department, 201 N. C. 707, 161 S. E.
203 (1931).
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It seems arguable that the accident occurred in the course of employ-
ment, for the Guardsman was entitled to pay and was proceeding
under the direction of his commanding officer at the time that the
accident occurred. However, the definition of "course of employ-
ment" apparently applied by the court in this case would leave little
room for such an argument.7 Further, even had the court taken the
view that the accident occurred in the course of employment, it is
probable that the fact that the injury was sustained on the public high-
way where the decedent was exposed to no greater risk than other
travelers,8 would have a tendency so to weaken the causal connection
between the employment and the accident as to result in the holding
that the accident did not arise out of the employment.9
Special circumstances may take the case out of the general rule
that injuries sustained in going to and from work are not com-
pensable. For instance, where, by the contract of employment, plain-
tiff was to furnish a team and do certain hauling for the employer,
an injury which plaintiff sustained from a shying horse while going
to work in the morning was held to be compensable, for, as he fur-
nished the team, his employment began when he left home with the
team.10
But the performance, while on the way to work, of some slight
duty incidental to the main employment will not constitute such a
circumstance as to suspend the operation of the general rule. Thus,
no compensation was allowed an oil truck driver whose duty it was
to solicit orders and who was injured while on the way to the place
'The court quotes with approval an excerpt from Bohlen, A Problem in the
Drafting of the Workmen's Compensation Acts, 25 HARv. L. REv. 401, 403, a
part of which is as follows: ". . . The place at which the injury is sustained
becomes the determining factor among those things which he [the employee]
does solely because he is engaged in a particular employment; only those are
regarded as in the course of the employment which are done within the master's
premises or upon some means of conveyance to or from his place of work
which is provided by the master for the sole use of his servants and which the
servant is required or entitled to use by virtue of his contract of employment."
'And his work as a National Guardsman did not render him peculiarly ex-
posed to dangers of the street or highway, as in the case of a delivery boy who
is almost constantly on the street. As to the latter, see Note (1920) 8 A. L. P.
935; Note (1923) 23 A. L. R. 403.
' But that the more recent cases give less weight to this doctrine of peculiar
exposure to street risks, see Note (1927) 51 A. L. R. 509, 514, 533.
" Crawford v. Long, Snider & Codgill, 1 N. C. I. C. 425 (1930). It is to be
noticed that in this case the furnishing of the team was an incident of the
employment. In the National Guardsman case, supra note 6, decedent did not
furnish his own car as an incident of his contract of employment as a member
of the National Guard.
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of the employer carrying an order for gas ;1 nor to a school janitor
who had been told by his employer, a few days before, to purchase
window cleaning material and who was injured while crossing a
street to get the material as he was on his way to work.12
Provision by the employer for transportation to or from work
must be included in the contract of employment to bring the employee
sb transported within the protection of the Act; he can not recover
for injury sustained during merely accommodatory transportation."3
Deviation.
In the following case the injury was 'by accident that occurred
during a deviation, and the question was presented whether the
deviation was so material as to preclude recovery. A salesman set
out in his car to go to the store of a customer. He departed from
the most direct route in order to stop at a drug store and procure
tobacco. He testified that he would not have planned to get the to-
bacco if he had not. been going to the customer's store. The total
length of his deviation would have been 3500 feet.14 He was injured
while on the way to the drug store and after having deviated from
the most direct route to the customer's store. The Supreme Court
sustained the claim for compensation, although there was one dissent-
ing opinion.15
Where the employee has deviated but has returned to the direct
route and is pursuing it at the time of the accident, compensation will
be awarded. 16 Plaintiff, a milk truck driver, worked for a dairy
located just outside the city. It was his duty to return the truck to
the employer's premises after each day's deliveries. One day, after
" Dudley v. The Texas Co., 2 N. C. I. C. 308 (1931).
'Massey v. Board of Education, 3 N. C. I. C. 26 (1931).
"Edwards v. T. A. Loving Co., 3 N. C. I. C. 30 (1931) (decedent was being
transported by employer from one place of work to another -when killed). See
Fox v. Phoenix Mills, 2 N. C. I. C. 261, 263 (i931), reversing 2 N. C. I. C.
149 (1930). Note (1929) 62 A. L. R. 1438; (1931) 8 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 699.
' Plaintiff lived on the -west side of Duke Street, and the customer's store
'was also located on the west side of Duke Street. But it does not appear how
long the direct route would have been.
"Parrish v. Armour Co., 200 N. C. 654, 158 S. E. 188 (1931). Stacy, C. 3.,
dissented.
As to injury to a local solicitor, collector, or outside salesman, see Note
(1924) 29 A. L. R. 120; Note (1925) 36 A. L. R. 474.
Another deviation case: Jackson v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 2 N. C.
1. C. 127 (1930), affirmed by full Commission, 2 N. C. I. C. 175 (1931) (motor-
cycle messenger boy stopped at motorcycle sh6p on way back from delivering
message and was injured there).
" Brown v. Hildebrand, 2 N. C. I. C. 203 (1930) ; Rogers v, Imperial Life
Insurance Co., 2 N. C. I. C. 335 (1931).
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making deliveries, he parked the truck in the city for an hour or two
while he engaged in personal business and amusement. While driving
from the city to the employer's premises, he suffered injury. The
Supreme Court allowed recovery.
17
It is believed that these cases indicated a continuation of the
moderately liberal attitude already adopted toward the problem of
deviation. The facts of the cases are such that no ground is offered
upon which to base an opinion that this attitude has been extended.'
8
Injury On Employer's Premises While Not About Regular Duties.
Where an employee steps aside from his regular duties but is still
on the employer's premises when injured, the award of compensation
seems contingent largely on the nature and extent of the departure.
In one case, plaintiff was a mill worker. The department in which
she worked closed at 11:00 o'clock, but all employees were forced to
remain on the premises until 11:30 before leaving. During this half-
hour period, plaintiff rode on an elevator to the first floor with a
friend to see about getting the friend employment. In returning,
plaintiff was seriously injured on the elevator. The Supreme Court
held that she was entitled to compensation.' 9 And where plaintiff
"caught up" with his work and went into another department to
notify the master mechanic that the plumbing in the house which had
been rented to the plaintiff by the employer was defective, and was
there injured by a lathe, it was held he could recover. 20 But where
the employee, while still on the employer's premises, steps aside and
a Jackson v. Dairymen's Creamery, 2 N. C. I. C. 346 (1931), affirmed, 202
N. C. 196, 162 S. E. 359 (1932).
" See Smith, op. cit. supra prefatory note, at 420.
" Bellamy v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 200 N. C. 676, 156 S. E. 246 (1931). On
the authority of this case, compensation was allowed in Britton v. Spofford, 3
N. C. I. C. 103 (1931) (plaintiff employed in card room passed through picker
room, stopped to talk a moment with another employee, was injured).
With Bellamy case, supra, cf. Taylor v. Hogan Milling Co., 129 Kan. 370,
282 Pac. 729 (1929), 66 A. L. R. 752 (1930) (employee injured while going on
elevator from one floor to another, with permission of employer, to pay bill;
compensation allowed).
In Johnson v. Provencal Turpentine Co., 125 So. 321 (La. 1929), recovery
was denied an employee 'who was injured on the premises of his employer after
the completion of his day's work and while he was performing a favor for the
benefit of a third person.
As to injury to an employee engaged in work for the employer (not neces-
sarily on the employer's premises) but outside the scope of his usual duty, see
Note (1924) 20 A. L. R 1335.
' Sisk v. Ora Mill Co., 1 N. C. I. C. 320 (1930).
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If the nature of the employment is such that the employee is
subjected to peculiar hazards, and he is injured by an accident which
arises out of his exposure to these hazards, he is entitled to compen-
sation.22 Thus, where decedent was a night watchman and was at-
tacked while punching the time clock by an unknown assailant, it was
held by the Supreme Court that the accident arose out of and in the
course of decedent's employment.23 In another case, decedent was a
boiler fireman who was required to be at the employer's planing mill
at 5:30 each morning. Near the mill were a well traveled highway
and a railroad; consequently, many tramps and "hitch-hikers" passed
by. Decedent was murdered and robbed by an unknown party after
he had gone to work. The Supreme Court sustained his claim. 24
Injury From Practice Which Is Tolerated By Employer.
In some of the cases, where the employer knew of some incidental
practice resorted to by the employees while about their work, and
raised no objection to it, the employee injured while following this
practice successfully asserted that the accident arose out of and in
the course of the employment. For example, the employer knew of
I Piercy v. Henrietta Mills, 2 N. C. I. C. 28 (1930) (plaintiff left usual
employment, went to rear of building, had lunch; on way back, while passing
a bobbin cleaning machine, he let the lid down and was injured) ; McCarter v.
Thomas Hosiery Mills, 2 N. C. I. C. 329 (1931) (during lunch hour plaintiff
went to another part of the premises, not by the well lighted and customary
way, but along a little used way, and claims he fell into oil pit and was in-
jured; compensation was denied, but conceivably, might have been awarded if
there had been sufficient evidence of acquiescence on the part of the employer in
the use of the hazardous way: see infra notes 25 and 26) ; Query v. Glasgow-
Allison Co., 3 N. C. I. C. 63 (1931) (plaintiff parked his private car in alley
in such a way that it interfered with passage of truck; went to move it, was
injured).
In Burris v. Southern Mfg. Co., 1 N. C. I. C. 423 (1930), plaintiff left
premises, walked across railroad tracks without employer's knowledge or con-
sent, and in absence of emergency. On way back, she claims she slipped on the
railroad tracks. Held, the injury was not compensable.
'Copper v. Rowan Cotton Mills Co., 2 N. C. I. C. 133 (1930) (plaintiff
was master mechanic subject to call at all times for purpose of keeping plant
operating efficiently, and had to cross congested highway frequently); Stan-
land v. Wilmington Terminal Warehouse Co., 2 N. C. I. C. 331 (1931) (de-
cedent, night watchman, attacked while guarding employer's warehouse).
'West v. East Coast Fertilizer Co., 2 N. C. I. C. 209 (1931), affirmed, 201
N. C. 556, 160 S. E. 765 (1931). As to injuries to watchman generally, see
Note (1920) 6A.L. R. 578; Note (1921) 13 A. L. R. 512.
Goodwin v. Bright, 3 N. C. I. C. 9 (1931), affirmed, 202 N. C. 481 (1932).
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the custom of the employees to go to the "hot water hole," where
steam was condensed into water, to get water for their own automo-
biles. Plaintiff was a fireman whose duty required that he go to the
hole twice each night to let water in the boiler. He fell into the water
and was burned, however, while attempting to get water for his car.
Compensation was given.2 5 And where the employer knew of and
tolerated horse-play among the employees, an injury received by
plaintiff as a result of another employee stepping on his foot and
pushing him while they were standing in line preparatory to checking
out, was held compensable.
26
Other Cases.
A newspaper employee was injured while playing on a baseball
team composed only of employees of the paper, in a game against a
team purporting to represent another newspaper in the same city.
27
Plaintiff recovered. But in a later case, an injury received by a mill
employee while playing on a baseball team composed of employees of
the mill, was held not to be compensable.28 In both cases, participa-
tion by employees seems to have been voluntary; equipment was
furnished -by the respective employers; conceivably both employers re-
ceived an indirect benefit from the recreational effect upon the morale
of the employees. In the latter case, on the day of the game, all the
employees were released about 4:00 P.M., and were made a gift of
their wages for the remainder of the working day; whether this was
so in the former case does not appear. In the former case the em-
ployer might have anticipated some benefit from the successful
competition of the team with that of the other newspaper; no such
element appears in the latter case. However, it is believed that any
distinction between the cases is tenuous, and that the latter case, in
denying compensation, reaches the more logical result.29 But par-
' Tucker v. Paola Cotton Mills, 1 N. C. I. C. 395 (1930)."- Wilkie v. American Enka Corp., 3 N. C. I. C. 44 (1931). See Chambers
v. Union Oil Co., 1 N. C. I. C. 221, 224, affirmed, 199 N. C. 28, 31, 153 S. E.
594, 596 (1930) (plaintiff, while filling an oil truck driven by him, was injured
by the accidental discharge of a pistol carried by a fellow truck driver; there
was some evidence of acquiescence by the employer in the habit of employees
in carrying weapons); Christopher v. Shuford Mill Co., 1 N. C. I. C. 420
(1930), affirmed by full Commission in 1 N. C. I. C. 483 (1930) (evidence of
acquiesceuce in plaintiff's operation of the machine at which he was injured).
' Bates v. Raleigh Times, 1 N. C. I. C. 433 (1930).
'Benson v. Nebel Knitting Mills, 3 N. C. I. C. 105 (1931).
" With these two cases, cf. Ryan v. State Industrial Commission, 128 Okla.
25, 261 Pac. 181 (1927) : plaintiff was employed by public utilities company as
meter reader, but evidence tended to show that he was hired primarily because
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ticipation in play may be so closely related to the employment as
clearly to become a part of it. For example, where plaintiff worked
for the proprietor of a bowling alley, and it was plaintiff's duty to
bowl with customers of the alley in order to stimulate business, an
injury received while bowling was held compensable.30
In another case, plaintiff was a hotel clerk. While about his
duties, he witnessed a woman register at the hotel with a man not
her husband. The husband subsequently brought an action for
divorce, and his attorney informed plaintiff's employer that he had a
subpoena for plaintiff, who was wanted as witness, but that if the
employer saw that plaintiff was present at the trial, he would not have
the subpoena served. Plaintiff went to the place of trial with his em-
ployer in the latter's car. On their way back, he was injured when
the car was wrecked. 31 Plaintiff's claim was sustained. Such a result
could be reached only 'by a very liberal construction of §2 (f).32
he was a good ball player, and the company indirectly maintained a team to
compete with those of other companies. Plaintiff sustained an injury while
practicing with the team near the place of employment during the lunch hour.
Held, if the injury occurred in the course of the employment, it did not arise
out of it; compensation denied.
' Dixon v. Parrish, 2 N. C. I. C. 375 (1931).
' Beal v. Cobb-Latta Hotel Co., 2 N. C. I. C. 100 (1930).
'The employer was not a party to the suit. If he had been, the case would,
of course, have been a much stronger one for allowing compensation.
Additional cases:
In the following cases, the accident was held to have arisen out of and in
the course of the employment: Wheeler v. City Ice & Fuel Co., 1 N. C. I. C.
363 (1930) (plaintiff injured while on trip for employer) ; Peoples v. Warren-
ton Box & Lumber Co., 1 N. C. I. C. 507 (1930) (plaintiff had been indulging
in horse-play but had abandoned it when injured) ; Wineberry v. Farley Stores,
Inc., 2 N. C. I. C. 64 (1930) (decedent met accident while aftempting to make
collections for employer); Buchanan v. Parker-Graham-Sexton, Inc., 202 N.
C. 176, 162 S. E. 223 (1931) (employee killed by gas poisoning; as to injury
from fumes as accident or occupational disease, see Note (1920) 6 A. L. R.
1466; Note (1923) 23 A. L. R. 335).
Accident not arising out of and in the course of the employment: Stewart
v. Curtis-Wright Flying Service, 2 N. C. I. C. 13 (1930) (airplane pilot in-
jured while "hopping" passenger for own profit); Whitley v. North Carolina
Highway Commission, 1 N. C. I. C. 393 (1930), affirmed, 201 N. C. 539, 160
S. E. 827 (1931) (plaintiff injured by shot from hunter while repairing high-
way truck; cf. Boris Const. Co. v. Haywood, 214 Ala. 162, 106 So. 799 (1925),
rehearing denied (1926) : decedent accidentally shot by small boy shooting at
sparrows while decedent was in course'of employment; compensation awarded) ;
Booth v. Scott Coal Co., 2 N. C. I. C. 323 (1931) (coal truck driver injured
while apparently using truck after working hours for personal motives) ; Sealey
v. American Enka Corp., 2 N. C. I. C. 328 (1931) (plaintiff injured after he
had seized fellow employee and threatened him with knife) ; Davis v. North
State Veneer Corp., 200 N. C. 263, 156 S. E. 859 (1931) (plaintiff injured while
performing voluntary errand for employer); Boyette v. Thompson-Wooten
Oil Co., 2 N. C. I. C. 378 (1931) (evidence that plaintiff was injured by coa-
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Although the case goes far in allowing compensation, it may perhaps
be justified on the ground that the employer apparently undertook to
see that plaintiff was present at the trial.
W. J. ADAms, JR.
Banks and Banking-Deposit for Specific Purpose as
Preferred Claim.
A bank received a deposit under an escrow agreement to be paid
to a third party subject to an arbitration. The bank having failed
pending the arbitration proceeding, it was held that the sum was a
deposit for a specific purpose, creating a trust relationship, and the
beneficiaries were entitled to a preferred claim to the funds in the
hands of the receiver.1
Bank deposits may be classified as either general, special, or de-
posits for a specific purpose.2 The ordinary deposit is general,
creating a debtor-creditor relationship between the depositor and the
bank.3 Upon failure of a bank containing such deposits, the general
depositor is not entitled to any preference over the creditors of the
bank, but shares pro rata with them.4  A special or segregated deposit
arises where it is agreed that the thing deposited shall be safely kept,
vulsion); Hemmingway v. Atlas Plywood Corp., 2 N. C. I. C. 269 (1931)
(plaintiff caught pneumonia while working in hole).
Where the cause of accident was entirely unrelated to the employment:
Honeycutt v. Vann Motor Co., 1 N. C. I. C. 510 (1930) (plaintiff injured while
trying to skate) ; Canter v. Surry County Board of Education, 1 N. C. I. C.
414 (1930) (school janitor injured on premises by shotgun he was carrying for
purpose of killing squirrel); Plyler v. Indian Trail School, 2 N. C. I. C. 343
(1931) (teacher made sick by food'furnished at teacherage where she boarded) ;
Vann v. Goldston School Board of Education, 2 N. C. L C. 361 (1931) (de-
cedent was school teacher; became sick at school and sent to principal for
aromatic spirits of ammonia; was sent poison ammonia, which she drank);
Bodenheimer v. Ragan Knitting Co., 3 N. C. I. C. 95 (1931) (plaintiff bitten
while at work by mad dog, owner unknown).
"Parker v. Central Bank and Trust Co. of Asheville, 202 N. C. 230, 162
S. E. 564 (1932).
2Corporation Commission of N. C. v. Merchants' Bank & Trust Co., 193
N. C. 696, 138 S. E. 24 (1927) ; 1 BouLEs, MODERN LAw OF BANKING (1907)
432.
, Corporation Commission of N. C. v. Merchants' Bank & Trust Co., 194
N. C. 125, 138 S. E. 530, 57 A. L. R. 382 (1927); Northwest Lumber Co. v.
Scandinavian-American Bank, 130 Wash. 38, 225 Pac. 825 (1924) ; 1 BouLEs,
op. cit. supr note 2. In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, a deposit
is presumed to be general. Washington Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Duke, 126 Wash.
510, 218 Pac. 232, 37 A. L. R. 611 (1923) ; Lawrence v. Lincoln County Trust
Co., 125 Me. 150,' 131 Atl. 863 (1926).
" McClain v. Wallace, 103 Ind. 562, 5 N. E. 911 (1885) ; Schmelling v. State,
57 Neb. 562, 78 N. W. 279 (1899) ; Bank of Blackwell v. Dean, 9 Okla. 626,
60 Pac. 226 (1900).
